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ON DENYING A PRESUPPOSITION  
OF SELLARS’ PROBLEM: 
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SÍNTESE – Há uma profunda divisão entre duas
concepções fundamentais na epistemologia ao 
longo dos últimos trinta a quarenta anos. Alguns 
rotulam essa divisão como sendo aquela entre
internalistas e externalistas, e essa caracterização
pode, mesmo, ser exata, conforme alguma expli-
cação dessa distinção. Eu abordarei a divisão por
um ângulo diferente, dado que uma abordagem
melhor é conceber a divisão como surgindo de
uma compreensão do Problema de Sellars. O meu
interesse é em posturas que recusam uma pres-
suposição crucial na formulação do Problema de
Sellars. Recusar essa pressuposição, como vere-
mos, é uma das respostas mais comuns ao
problema. Argumentarei, no entanto, que tal 
recusa é simplesmente insustentável, tanto na 
teoria da justificação quanto na teoria do conhe-
cimento. 
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ABSTRACT – There is a great divide between 
two approaches to epistemology over the past 
thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that 
between internalists and externalists, and that 
characterization may be accurate on some 
account of the distinction. I will pursue the divide 
from a different direction, since a better approach 
is to think of the divide as arising from an 
understanding of Sellars’ Problem. My interest is 
in positions that deny a crucial presupposition in 
the formulation of Sellars’ Problem. Denying this 
presupposition, as we will see, is one of the most 
common responses to the problem. I will argue,
however, that this denial is simply untenable,
both in the theory of justification and in the 
theory of knowledge. 
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There is a great divide between two approaches to epistemology over the 
past thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that between internalists and ex-
ternalists, and that characterization may be accurate on some account of the dis-
tinction. I will pursue the divide from a different direction, in part because the 
literature on the distinction between internalism and externalism has become a 
mess, and I don’t want to clean up the mess here. 
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A better approach is to think of the divide as arising from an understanding of 
Sellars’ Problem.
1 Though not discussed as often as the internalism/externalism 
distinction, there are enough varieties of characterizations of this problem that I 
will start with my own specific characterization. Before doing so, however, I want 
to distance myself from having to defend the claim that my specific characteriza-
tion is the proper interpretation of the Sellarsian corpus. I’m interested in the prob-
lem itself, not whether the precise formulation I give is one that can be found in 
Sellars’ writings. 
In discussing this problem and the lessons we can learn from a proper ap-
preciation of it, I will focus significantly on the proper function theory of knowl-
edge proposed by Alvin Plantinga.
2 As will be clear, however, my interest is in a 
broad range of positions represented by this proper function theory, positions 
that deny a crucial presupposition in the formulation of Sellars’ Problem. Deny-
ing this presupposition, as we will see, is one of the most common responses to 
the problem. I will argue, however, that this denial is simply untenable, both in 
the theory of justification and in the theory of knowledge. The lesson of our 
investigation will not be a solution to Sellars’ Problem, but a reinvigorated 
stance that the problem must be faced head-on. 
So, what is Sellars’ Problem? In a nutshell, the Sellars’ Problem concerns the 
relationship between experience and belief. Sellars wanted to know how experi-
ence could justify belief, and there are two options here. Either experiences 
have semantic (propositional, informational) content or they do not. If they do 
not, they cannot make the truth of a belief intelligible in the way justification is 
supposed to make the truth of a claim understood and seen intellectually. They 
can cause one to hold a belief, we may assume, but the relationship between 
experience and belief would not be a rational one. It would be more like having 
a pill that induced certain kinds of thoughts: taking the pill causes the thoughts, 
but can’t be used to explain why the thoughts are true or likely to be true. So, it 
would appear, if experiences are going to help justify what we believe, they will 
need to have propositional content. Yet, if these experiences do have proposi-
tional content, that content can be either appropriate or inappropriate to the 
context in question, in which case such contents are themselves epistemically 
evaluable, and a regress problem looms. The Sellars’ Problem is, thus, a problem 
arising from the question of whether experiences have semantic content. 
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Some quite common approaches to the problem are utter failures. It won’t 
help, for example, to say that experience doesn’t justify belief, but only prods 
belief. If we suppose that there are some beliefs that are directly caused by ex-
perience, the question remains whether those beliefs are justified, and if so, how. 
The standard reply for those who deny that experience justifies belief is coher-
entist in nature: they are justified by their relation to an entire system of beliefs. 
This reply avoids Sellars’ problem, but only at the expense of creating another. For 
if such beliefs are justified solely by their relation to a system of beliefs, they’d still 
be so justified in the absence of the experiences or in the presence of quite differ-
ent, but same-prompting, experiences. 
It will not do, either, to say that it is only our beliefs about our experiences 
that form the beginning point for justification. If I believe that my experience is of 
a red apple, that may justify my believing that there is a red apple on the table, 
but only if my original belief is appropriate to my experience. Besides, such an 
account is psychologically implausible–most of us don’t normally form beliefs 
about the character or content of our experiences–but even apart from that point, 
the view simply doesn’t address Sellars’ question about how experience makes 
certain beliefs appropriate in a given context.      
These approaches, common as they are in the history of epistemology, give 
cause for concern. Their failure calls for a reflective distancing of ourselves from 
the fray of epistemological theorizing. They call us to meta-theory to try to figure 
out what can be done to assuage our discomfort in the face of Sellars’ problem. 
The meta-theoretical options that have developed can be described as fol-
lows. The first option is to call attention to, and then jettison, a presupposition of 
Sellars’ problem. That presupposition is that the notion of justification (or whatever 
notion is thought to close the gap between true belief and knowledge) is con-
nected with the notions of intelligibility, rational insight, and the cognitively un-
derstood, seen, or grasped. The problem as described asks for an explanation as to 
how experience justifies belief in the sense of making the truth of the belief intelli-
gible, seen, or understood; an explanation as to how a particular experience yields 
a rational grasp of the truth of the particular belief that it justifies. On such an 
approach, this presupposition is mistaken; it is better to characterize the cognitive 
machine more on the model of inputs and outputs, where the outputs are beliefs 
and the inputs can be whatever the particular theorist wishes to hold generates 
epistemic value for beliefs (including experiences). Intelligibility and understanding 
are replaced by notions such as reliability of the mechanism, proper functioning of 
the system, and production by systems that get us to the truth at least most of the 
time. 
The other approach refuses to give up on the notions of intelligibility and un-
derstanding in the theory of justification, hoping to find some way in which ex-
perience can play a role in justification without succumbing to Sellars’ problem. 
The difference between this approach and the above approach is this: the present 
approach tries to solve Sellars’ problem, granting that it is a problem that must be 
solved, while the above approach denies a presupposition of the problem and   176
thereby holds that there is no problem here to be solved. The latter approach 
holds that what is thought of by the former camp as a distinctive feature of ra-
tional beings–the sense of intelligibility and understanding when rationality is 
displayed–is nothing more than an occasional (or perhaps more general) artifact of 
cognition. Even if this aspect were a universal accompaniment of displays of ra-
tionality, it is a mere epiphenomenon of the material which it is the job of episte-
mological theory to characterize properly. 
My procedure here will be to examine this problem focusing especially on the 
epistemological theory of Alvin Plantinga. It is essential to Plantinga’s philosophy 
that the presupposition in question is false, for his account of how belief in God is 
properly basic and thereby warranted depends crucially on the model of inputs 
and outputs, without any attending need to display the intelligibility of the con-
nection between experience and belief. Plantinga holds, quite rightly, that belief in 
God can be prompted in any number of ways: seeing the majesty of the mighty 
Tetons, the delicate beauty of a flower; or by experiencing a feeling of thankful-
ness for things going well, or simply in the face of the experience of the joy of life 
itself, etc. What matters is not whether these experiences give rational insight into 
the truth of the claim that God exists, but whether the input/output relationship 
between these experiences and the belief that God exists is reliable and a display 
of a system that is functioning properly. Examining his theory will thus provide a 
good test case for determining whether jettisoning the presupposition in question 
is the right approach to take in addressing Sellars’ Problem. 
Other contemporary approaches side with Plantinga on this issue. Plantinga’s 
theory is a version of reliabilism, a theory which eschews the presupposition of 
Sellars’ problem. Reliabilist theories are characterized by two factors. The first 
involves some way of sorting mechanisms or processes into kinds. The second is a 
requirement that the input/output relationship have as outputs beliefs that are 
likely to be true. The kind of likelihood in question can vary from a simple fre-
quency approach to a more sophisticated albeit mysterious propensity view. 
This categorization is not in the least surprising, but it is surprising to note 
that some versions of foundationalism and some versions of coherentism deny the 
presupposition as well. Consider the following version of foundationalism. It claims 
that all justified belief traces to experience, but denies that experiences justify 
basic beliefs in virtue of some shared content. Instead, experiences have no con-
tent, they are merely the causal originators of basic beliefs, and justify those basic 
beliefs because they are their causes. Such a theory must deny that our experi-
ences make intelligible to us the beliefs that they cause, since justification for 
basic beliefs would remain the same on such a theory of the relationship between 
experiences and beliefs were the relationship randomly varied so that different 
experiences caused different beliefs. 
A similar issue plagues certain versions of coherentism. Some versions of coher-
entism insist that the role played by experience is merely a causal one, but that it is 
an important role, since it is imagined to be crucial to the success of coherentism 
that some beliefs are spontaneous responses to the “prick of sense”, in Lehrer’s   177
memorable terminology.
3 As I think of coherentists, they have the strongest interest 
in rendering the justification relation so that it preserves the rational intelligibility of 
the justification relation and so that the presence of this relation depends upon some 
kind of rational insight relating the grounds of the belief. But the form of coherentism 
that simply limits experience to playing only some causal role in the story of justifi-
cation, simply so that some elements in the system of beliefs count as spontaneous 
belief, will have a hard time explaining why it matters which elements in the system 
of beliefs are the spontaneous ones. The only way to do so is to insist that there are 
special argument forms needed to justify spontaneous beliefs that are not used in 
the account of the justification of non-spontaneous beliefs, and even with this 
emendation, the theory will still be susceptible to the objection that the experiences 
could vary wildly so long as they still cause the same spontaneous beliefs. 
Here’s one way to look at these versions of foundationalism and coherentism. 
Those who develop foundationalist and coherentist theories of the last two types 
seem to be imaginatively limited regarding the kinds of cognitive beings there might 
be. If we assume that any possible cognitive being is pretty much like us, having 
links between experience and belief pretty much like us, it becomes easier to see 
how such theories can end up looking plausible to their defenders. The problem is 
the lack of imagination. Cognitive beings can have radically different sensory inputs 
than we have, and perhaps no sensory inputs at all; and the connections between 
sensory inputs that are similar to ours can be wired to beliefs in ways radically dif-
ferent than ours. In some such cases, perhaps these differences won’t make a differ-
ence to the justificatory status of their belief, but in other cases, these differences 
will make a dramatic difference. In some cases, that is, such a radically abnormal 
link between experience and belief may still result in justification, but in other cases, 
it will not. It is crucial to the development of a complete epistemology to consider 
the implications of one’s theory both for normal human beings and for beings quite 
different from us. I suspect that the attraction for these inadequate versions of foun-
dationalism and coherentism is a simple failure to consider the implications of these 
theories for radically abnormal possibilities. 
This point would seem to play into the hands of those denying the presupposi-
tion of Sellars’ problem, but that conclusion would be premature. First, cognitive 
beings devoid of sensory input and who rely on rational intuition and inference alone 
are an easy case, since rational intuition, on its face, delivers the needed intelligibil-
ity feature that is the heart of the presupposition in question. That leaves only be-
ings for whom the initial inputs into the system of beliefs is on the basis of some-
thing other than rational intuition, and there is no difficulty using the language of 
sensory inputs to characterize such beings. Once we get this far, however, Sellars’ 
problem can be stated and the presupposition in question either embraced or de-
nied, so it is a mistake to think that the more general perspective requires denying 
the presupposition of Sellars’ problem solely on the basis of what we have seen to 
this point. 
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To reiterate what was said earlier, my goal is to show that there is no future 
in denying this presupposition of Sellars’ problem. I wish here to press two differ-
ent complaints against such theories. Such theories can be either theories of 
knowledge or theories of justification, and my complaints fall into these two cate-
gories. First, I will argue that theories of justification that deny the presupposition 
cannot hope to succeed, and then I will argue that theories of knowledge that 
deny the presupposition suffer from the same malady. 
The denial of the presupposition of Sellars’  
problem in the theory of justification 
A central feature of justification is that it can be truly predicated both of be-
liefs and propositions that are not believed. We can correctly claim that my be-
lief that I have two children is justified, and we can correctly claim that George 
Bush is justified in believing that going to war was a mistake, even though he 
does not in fact believe that claim (readers not persuaded of the truth of what I 
claim here about the President are free to substitute other examples where peo-
ple refuse to believe what is obvious). I term the former kind of justification 
“doxastic justification”, and the latter “propositional justification.”
4 
It is worth noting that this feature has an analogue in the arena of action, 
though it is easy to miss. We can speak of actions that are justified, and refer 
both to tokens, which of course are actually performed, or to types, which need 
not have any actual instances. Thus, one can speak of being justified in driving 
70 miles per hour on a given stretch of road even though one is going only 55. In 
such a case, there is an untokened action type that is justified, and as such is an 
analogue of the kind of justification one can have for a belief that one does not 
hold. 
A complete theory of justification will account for both types of justification, 
explaining one in terms of the other or claiming that they are irreducible to each 
other. The irreducibility thesis is hard to sustain, however, since it is fairly easy to 
see how to characterize doxastic justification in terms of propositional: doxastic 
justification is simply a function of propositional justification plus proper basing: 
where the belief is held because of, or on the basis of, the features that justify it. 
Such an account not only undermines the irreducibility claim but also pre-
sents a challenge. The account takes propositional justification as basic and 
shows how to understand doxastic justification in terms of it; we can call the 
resulting position “propositionalism.” Doxasticism takes a contrary position, 
according to which doxastic justification is the basic sort, and propositional 
justification should be understood in terms of it. 
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As the above account shows, it is easy to see how to be a propositionalist; it 
is much harder to see how to be a doxasticist. For it is not always true that when 
one concept can be understood in terms of another, the roles can be reversed. My 
goal is to show the problems for doxasticism because of its connection to the 
approach to Sellars’ Problem that denies the presupposition of it on which we are 
focusing. I will first show the defects of doxasticism, and then show the connec-
tion this discussion has to Sellar’s Problem and this presupposition. 
Plantinga’s is a paradigm case of a theory that denies the presupposition of 
Sellars’ problem. It is also a paradigm case of doxasticism. Plantinga says of his 
theory,   
According to the central and paradigmatic core of our notion of warrant (so I say) a be-
lief B has warrant for you if and only if (1) the cognitive faculties involved in the pro-
duction of B are functioning properly [...] (2) your cognitive environment is sufficiently 
similar to the one for which your cognitive faculties are designed; (3) [...] the design 
plan governing the production of the belief in question involves, as purpose or func-
tion, the production of true beliefs [...]; and (4) the design plan is a good one: that is, 
there is a high statistical or objective probability that a belief produced in accordance 
with the relevant segment of the design plan in that sort of environment is true.
5 
The crucial element in this quote is right up front: according to Plantinga, the 
“central and paradigmatic core” of warrant is where “a belief B has warrant for 
you.” Talk of beliefs here is not some causal language that could be replaced with 
talk of the content of a hypothetical belief, i.e., a proposition, for clause (1) of the 
above account makes clear that B is an actual belief of yours. Plantinga thus en-
dorses doxasticism with regard to the concept of warrant, but he is also aware 
that the terms of epistemic appraisal apply to things other than beliefs. He notes 
that we appraise not only a person’s beliefs “but also her skepticisms or (to use 
another Chisholmian term) her withholdings, her refrainings from belief. An unduly 
credulous person may believe what she ought not; an unduly skeptical (or cynical) 
person may fail to believe what she ought.”
6 
The question of the relationship between these kinds of epistemic appraisal 
deserves attention, and the same issues involved with doxasticism regarding justi-
fication come into play here as well. Warrant, as well as whatever other term of 
epistemic appraisal one prefers, can be a feature of both beliefs and propositions, 
and it is easy to see how to characterize doxastic warrant in terms of propositional 
warrant. That approach, however, is not Plantinga’s, for he holds that the funda-
mental notion of warrant is doxastic warrant. 
There is a way of objecting to what I’ve said, and will say below, about Plant-
inga that I want to forestall before proceeding further. In the early stages of develop-
ing his theory, Plantinga at times talks as if the term ‘warrant’ is meant merely as a 
placeholder for whatever turns true belief into knowledge. When viewed in this way, 
one might insist that Plantinga only has a theory of knowledge, and that any at-
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tempt to characterize his theory of warrant so that it can be classified with theories 
of justification and other terms of epistemic appraisal simply ignores the stipulative 
character of his use of the term warrant. It is not obvious to me that, even granting 
this point, there will be anything problematic in what I say about Plantinga’s theory 
of warrant, but it is worth pointing out that Plantinga’s mature account of warrant 
cannot be stipulatively identified with what turns true belief into knowledge. 
Though Plantinga talked this way in the early stages of developing his account, his 
mature theory treats warrant as that quantity which, when one has enough of it and 
when one’s cognitive mini-environment is favorable, one’s true belief counts as 
knowledge. This mature account makes warrant necessary, though not sufficient, for 
turning true belief into knowledge. Moreover, warrant is now specified to be a prop-
erty that comes in degrees. These two features are all that is needed to classify 
Plantinga’s theory of warrant together with theories of justification and other terms 
of epistemic appraisal. 
Plantinga is not alone in endorsing doxasticism, nor is he alone in ignoring the 
question of the relationship between doxastic and propositional justification or war-
rant (or whatever epistemic term of art is preferred here).
7 Of the major defenders of 
theories of epistemic appraisal who count as doxasticists, Alvin Goldman is the only 
one who has devoted serious attention to the relationship between doxastic and 
propositional uses of terms of epistemic appraisal.
8 
The problem is that doxasticism cannot succeed. In order for doxasticism to 
succeed, it will have to talk about a hypothetical belief when attempting to charac-
terize propositional justification for the content of a possible belief. It will then have 
to claim that this hypothetical belief would, or could, be held justifiably. The “could” 
reading is much too broad–nearly any belief could be held justifiably–so the obvious 
path is to talk in terms of what beliefs would be justified if they were added to one’s 
total corpus of beliefs. In addition, the doxasticist will want to include among the 
circumstances in which the belief is added that it is added in such a way that it is 
properly based. 
Such a view faces problems from two different directions. The first concerns in-
dividuals who are cognitively admirable, so admirable that they simply wouldn’t 
believe a claim if it were not justified for them. At the extreme is God, who has such 
a property essentially. Even among ordinary humans, however, there is the possibil-
ity of such an individual. Given such admirability, the approach just outlined must 
conclude that such individuals have propositional warrant for absolutely every claim, 
including having warrant for any claim p and its denial ~p. Since having warrant for 
contradictory claims is impossible, doxasticism is in trouble. 
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The natural reply notices that for such individuals, one’s body of evidence will 
need to shift in certain cases in order for an added belief to be justified. It would 
be philosophical suicide, though, for a doxasticist to adopt this characterization of 
the case, for doing so admits that justificatory status is a function of evidence, and 
the existence of evidence confirming a claim doesn’t require believing it. A better 
strategy is to try to use a surrogate for the concept of evidence, such as talking 
about a person’s total cognitive state or noetic complex changing. Using this sur-
rogate language, the doxasticist can say that a proposition is justified for a person 
if and only if, were the person to believe that proposition while remaining in the 
same total cognitive state, the belief would be justified. This is not quite right, of 
course: adding the belief can’t be done without changing the total cognitive state 
of the person. So, the idea would be to add the belief while altering the noetic 
complex as little as possible to accommodate the added belief. 
The effort here is noteworthy, but the results are less than one might hope. 
First, the added requirement works at best only for ordinary cognitive agents. If a 
being is essentially cognitively admirable, the additional requirement won’t help in 
the least. In the case of God, it doesn’t help at all: any belief God might add to his 
store of beliefs could only be added when he’d be justified in believing the claim 
in question. Moreover, even for ordinary humans, it might not help. Some episte-
mologists have held that some beliefs fall into a kind of belief regarding which we 
cannot be wrong, about which we are infallible. I am not convinced they are right 
if we are talking about introspective beliefs, but suppose they are: that is, suppose 
that some of our beliefs are infallible and justified because of it. Then there will be 
a range of propositions which are such that if we were to believe them, altering 
our noetic condition no more than is necessary to accommodate the belief, we’d 
be justified in believing them. On the theory in question, we are essentially cogni-
tively admirable about this range of propositions. The version of doxasticism can-
not accommodate this theoretical possibility. 
The problem of cognitive admirability is only one of the problems faced by 
doxasticism, however. The other problem is an extension of the known fact that 
belief itself sometimes creates evidence for itself. For example, you are more likely 
to succeed at certain tasks if you believe that you will succeed. The extension of 
this idea is that belief itself can also count against a claim that you have good 
evidence for, as when self-doubts cause people to have less evidence than they 
would have otherwise for thinking they’ll succeed. In the starkest cases, belief 
itself can completely undermine evidence for its content, as when early math 
students know that they’ve never squared any number greater than five, and so 
have evidence that they’ve never considered the proposition that nine squared is 
eighty-one. In such a case, this proposition can be justified for them, but if they 
were to add belief in this claim to their total cognitive state, the added belief 
would destroy whatever evidence they had for the claim prior to believing it. It 
would destroy this evidence because, once they come to believe the claim, it will 
be obvious that they’ve considered the claim that nine squared is eighty-one.   182
Such cases block any attempt to understand propositional justification in 
terms of what beliefs would be justified if they were believed. The proper conclu-
sion to draw is that doxasticism is false, and that propositionalism is true: that the 
fundamental epistemic relation is that between evidence and propositions sup-
ported or confirmed by that evidence. 
The point of this discussion of doxasticism and propositionalism is the way in 
which these positions connect with Sellars’ Problem. First, if one is a proposi- 
tionalist, one will not be able to deny the presupposition of Sellars’ Problem that is 
in focus here. If that is correct, the only hope for those who wish to deny this 
presupposition is to escape propositionalism, and as we’ve just seen, that can’t be 
done. So, if propositionalists can’t deny this presupposition, one cannot escape 
Sellars’ Problem in the way envisioned by Plantinga and other doxasticists. 
The crucial step in this argument is the claim that propositionalists cannot 
deny the presupposition in question. To defend this step, I’ll first give an intuitive 
argument for it, and then examine how a propositionalist might try to explain the 
connection between belief and experience without any commitment to the pre-
supposition in question. So, first, here’s the intuition argument: the notion of evi-
dence involves the idea of making things evident, and what is made evident to me 
is what I come to see as obvious, intelligible, and understood. It is something 
regarding which I’ve now gained insight on the basis of that which has made it 
evident to me. Since characterizing the relationship of one thing propositionally 
justifying another is most plausibly interpreted in terms of the first thing providing 
evidence for the second, propositionalism is committed to the presupposition of 
Sellars’ Problem that Plantinga and other doxasticists wish to deny. 
We can get to this same conclusion by investigating the options of theory de-
velopment open to propositionalists. For propositionalists having any hope of solv-
ing Sellars’ problem, evidence will come either in the form of other believed 
propositions or in terms of experience. If experiences have content, then that 
content provides resources to help explain how these experiences justify certain 
propositions in a way that makes the connection between the two intelligible to 
cognitive agents who have the experience and thereby come to believe the related 
propositions. Of course, that is not to say that the story will be easy or simple to 
describe, nor is it to say that any extant stories by propositionalists have given an 
adequate explanation of the link between experience and belief. My point is only 
this: if experiences have content, then we are well on our way to a solution to 
Sellars’ Problem. 
Suppose, however, that experience has no semantic or representational con-
tent. In virtue of what does the experience count as evidence for the related 
proposition? One answer commits one to doxasticism: that an experience is evi-
dence for a proposition just when anyone who believes that proposition upon 
having that experience has a justified belief, perhaps when the connection is a 
reliable one (and perhaps satisfies other conditions as well, such as a proper func-
tion condition). As we’ve seen already, however, doxasticism cannot succeed, and 
in any case, we are at present trying to discover what a propositionalist might say   183
on the supposition that experiences have no content. So how could a proposition-
alist explain how an experience with no content counts as evidence for the sup-
ported proposition? 
I think the answer is that there is no such approach available, but to see this, 
we need to consider one approach to this problem developed by epistemologists 
who display at least some sympathy for propositionalism. I will not endeavor to 
determine whether they are propositionalists in the end. Instead, I only want to 
show that their approach cannot be used to reject the presupposition of Sellars’ 
Problem we are considering here. 
Some who are sympathetic to propositionalism adopt an account at this point 
that appeals only to recognition skills: the experience counts as evidence for the 
proposition because the cognitive agent has learned to recognize the truth of that 
proposition on the basis of that experience.
9 The general form of explanation here 
is in terms of know-how. Instead of positing an intelligible connection between 
the experience and the belief, the present approach treats the connection on the 
model of practical rather than theoretical knowledge. I want to argue, however, 
that such an approach cannot be satisfactory without providing the resources 
needed by propositionalism for retaining the presupposition in question here of 
Sellars’ Problem. 
In light of the possibilities of manipulation by evil demons and the like, the 
practical approach here cannot assume that the process by which stable disposi-
tions to form beliefs in the presence of sensory stimuli is a process that generates 
know-how, or involves the development of recognition skills, where these latter 
two notions are understood in a way that requires epistemic success in the proc-
ess. To learn to recognize colors, for example, implies the development of a skill 
that is present only when one has learned to distinguish accurately one color from 
another. But to develop stable dispositions in the presence of sensory stimuli in-
volving colors only requires some sort of systematicity in one’s belief formations in 
the presence of such stimuli, whether or not such systematicity involves accuracy. 
The practical approach thus divides into two camps, those who plump for 
some sort of reliability or accuracy at the end of the process and those who do 
not. Those who plump for accuracy, I will say, understand the practical approach 
in terms of the development of know-how on the part of the cognitive agent. It is 
fair to characterize those who adopt this theory as joining hands with their reli-
abilist cousins in denying the presupposition of Sellars’ problem, for intelligibility, 
rational insight, and that which is understood, seen, or grasped intellectually plays 
little or no role in this theory. Instead, these features of the presupposition in 
question come into play only after the fundamental work of developing the re-
quired know-how has been achieved. 
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What of the weaker version of the practical approach, on which the question 
is only a matter of developing stable dispositions in the face of sensory stimuli? On 
this version, once such dispositions are in place, the story of epistemic justifica-
tion can be told in terms of these dispositions: upon having a certain experience, 
the individual in question has evidence in favor of a belief just in case that indi-
vidual has a disposition to connect experiences of that kind with that belief. Here, 
again, there is no question of intelligibility and its ilk in the story of the relation-
ship between experience and these basic beliefs. Instead, there is only the matter 
of what kinds of stable dispositions have developed. 
As a result, this form of the practical model joins in the rejection of the presup-
position of Sellars’ problem as well. We might put this point as follows. The practical 
model, whether or not of reliabilist persuasion, appears to have no need of the pre-
supposition in question. For when a discussion of basic beliefs occurs, the concept 
of justification employed is that which connects experiences to beliefs, not experi-
ences with a given content to a propositional content that might or might not be 
believed. On the know-how model, there is only a disposition to come to a particular 
belief in the presence of a certain experience. The experience has no feature in itself 
that can make evident the content of the belief that is formed, and because there is 
no content that can play such a role, there is no intelligible connection between 
experiences of a certain kind and the beliefs that result from them. 
We can show, however, that without endorsing the presupposition in ques-
tion, the practical knowledge model is bound to fail. Suppose I have a sensory 
experience for which I have a stable disposition connecting such an experience 
with believing p. Suppose also that in the present case I do not believe p, perhaps 
because I have a strong desire for p to be false. So, we assume, the experience 
justifies p for me, but I don’t believe p. Defenders of the practical knowledge 
model have to explain such justification by recourse to a hypothetical belief that I 
do not have: had I formed the belief it would have been justified (because of the 
practical skills I’ve developed in the process of cognitive maturation). 
This approach suffers at the hands of the problem of cognitive admirability as 
much as doxasticism does: cognitively admirable individuals satisfy the counter-
factual claim in question regarding lots of propositions that are not presently justi-
fied for them, and cognitively ideal agents who can’t fail to believe what’s justified 
turn out to have justification for every proposition (since no proposition is essen-
tially such that there couldn’t be a learning process that forms a disposition to 
believe such a claim in the presence of some sensory stimulation or other). 
Defenders of this view will, of course, begin tinkering with the counterfactual 
I used to characterize that position, in hopes of finding one that avoids the prob-
lem I mention. Here I have a challenge, however. All counterfactual accounts must 
face the issue of the conditional fallacy described by Robert Shope in his 1979 
paper in the Journal of Philosophy. In the paper, Shope describes the character of 
the fallacy, and gives a recipe for constructing counterexamples to counterfactual 
accounts. So my challenge is this: before being satisfied with any particular tinker-
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cannot be applied to the new account. Such an argument is a rational requirement 
on any counterfactual account in philosophy, and it is astounding how common it 
is to find philosophers still relying on counterfactual accounts without presenting 
such an argument and without showing any awareness of Shope’s results. 
In addition, the practical knowledge model has trouble with the fact that be-
lief itself sometimes creates or undermines evidence for it. Suppose you’ve devel-
oped a stable disposition for forming the belief that p in the presence of sensory 
stimulation S. Let S be Hume, and suppose Hume has become obsessed with the 
missing shade of blue, so much so that he has developed the following stable 
disposition: every sensory stimulation disposes him toward two beliefs, one about 
the particular color he’s experiencing and the other that the object in question is 
not the missing shade of blue. This disposition is quite reliable, we may assume. 
But now, after years of experience and conditioning to reinforce this disposition, 
Hume finds the missing shade of blue. He is disposed to believe that the object is 
blue and that it is not the missing shade of blue, for that is what our description of 
his stable dispositions tells us. He believes, however, that the object is blue and 
that it is the missing shade of blue. Both beliefs are justified, and had he not be-
lieved that this is the missing shade of blue, that proposition would still have been 
justified for him by the experience in question. But for the practical knowledge 
model, there is the problem of the disposition in question not to form this belief. If 
that is the only disposition in question, then the experience can’t be evidence that 
this is the missing shade of blue. 
So perhaps there is another disposition: the disposition that has developed to 
discriminate one color from another. The problem now is that the practical knowl-
edge model involves too many dispositions: there are dispositions that underlie 
ascriptions of justification both to p and to ~p. But that can’t be right. So the 
practical knowledge model will have to incorporate some feature that allows one 
of the dispositions to trump the other one, without endorsing the obvious explana-
tion that it is the content of the experience of the missing shade of blue itself that 
makes the claim that this is the missing shade of blue justified, in spite of the 
competing disposition to believe that this is not the missing shade of blue. 
The natural move for the defender of the practical knowledge model to make 
here is to appeal to the qualitative character of the experiences in question to 
avoid this problem. The idea here is that experience has a qualitative character to 
it, even though it lacks propositional or semantic content. A standard example of 
such is the sensation of pain, which has a qualitative character, but apparently no 
propositional or semantic content. The idea here, applied to the Hume example 
above, is that Hume’s perceptual states have a qualitative character to them, and 
believing that the object is the missing shade of blue accords with that qualitative 
character. Presumably, Hume’s prior experiences that justified the claim that the 
objects of his experience were not the missing shade of blue also had a qualitative 
character to them. The difference here is that the qualitative character of the pre-
sent experience is different and does not include the qualitative character that 
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If the practical knowledge model is developed along these lines, however, it 
will no longer be in a position to deny the presupposition of Sellars’ Problem under 
discussion here. The qualitative character of the experience involves informational 
content of some sort. The experience of pain, as well as the experience of the 
missing shade of blue, is an informational state, where the information can be 
transferred by the human system in question to a belief state that also involves 
that same informational content. Qualitative character just is informational content 
detected by the individual in question. If it weren’t, it could help explain the 
Hume example. For another quality possessed by his experience is that of occur-
ring at a particular distance from the North Pole, and surely no beliefs involving 
that qualitative feature of the experience would normally be justified by the ex-
perience alone. The qualitative character of the experience is a character that 
involves qualities or properties, ones detected by the cognitive system in question. 
Hume’s belief that the object is the missing shade of blue is a belief constituted in 
part by some of these very same qualities or properties. As a result, the appeal to 
qualitative character cannot be something other than some type of informational 
content that is capable of being transferred by the human system from the modal-
ity of experience to the modality of belief. 
I think the motivation to deny informational content to experience is driven 
by the thought that the only content there could be for experience would be 
conceptual content. That would create additional problems, since it would imply 
that infants don’t have any experience without having concepts, and thus that 
some concepts would have to be innate. But experiential content need not be 
conceptual in order to involve informational content. The right question to ask 
here concerns the best explanation for how beliefs come to have the precise 
propositional character they have on the basis of the experiences of the organ-
ism, and here the answer seems compelling: it is on the basis of the transfer of 
informational content from one subsystem of the organism to another.
10 
I submit, then, that there is no avoiding the presupposition of Sellars’ prob-
lem within the theory of justification. The conclusion to draw is that an ade-
quate theory of justification will have to be propositional in character, and will 
thus need to account for how experience makes intelligible the beliefs that it 
causes to be formed. Nothing less can be adequate. It might be, however, that 
within the theory of knowledge, something less can be adequate, so I turn in the 
next section to consider this possibility. 
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The denial of the presupposition of Sellars’  
problem in the theory of knowledge 
We turn, then, to the prospects for a denial of the presupposition in the theory 
of knowledge. We abandon the attempt to characterize the nature of justification 
in the process of completing our theory of knowledge; instead, we simply intend 
to characterize the difference between true belief and knowledge with reference to 
a theory that refuses to endorse the presupposition of Sellars’ problem. 
A primary exponent of such an approach is Alvin Plantinga, especially with 
the early versions of his proper functionalism, though there are other versions of 
the view as well, a primary example being the views of Armstrong and Dretske.
11 
Here I will focus on Plantinga’s version of the approach, since the requirements 
of the other views are clearly too strong. Armstrong’s view requires a piece of 
knowledge to be the product of some lawlike regularity, and Dretske’s requires 
production by information that makes it a certainty (i.e., a probability of 1) that 
the belief is correct. Both requirements are too strong, the first because knowl-
edge can occur even in indeterministic worlds. The second view is too strong as 
well, since our subjective probability should accord with the objective probabil-
ity of truth, but if our degree of belief in what we know has a probability of 1, 
then it will never be rational to abandon belief in what we know. Since mislead-
ing evidence has such power, we shouldn’t accept quite so strong an account of 
knowledge. 
Plantinga’s theory fares better on these points. So suppose we use the the-
ory as an account of that which bridges the gap between true belief and knowl-
edge, to see whether the presupposition of Sellars’ problem can be avoided. 
Plantinga’s account of this property, which I will term ‘warrant’, with the 
understanding that the term is now being used merely as a placeholder for the 
value X in the equation “true belief + X = knowledge”, involves the following 
concepts. First, a belief is warranted only if it is produced by cognitive faculties 
that are functioning properly. In order to be functioning properly, these faculties 
must be operating according to their design plan. Other features of Plantinga’s 
view tie the notion of warrant more closely to truth. One feature is that the de-
sign plan of the faculty in question is one that is aimed at the production of true 
belief, and it must also be true that the design plan is a good one, i.e., that there 
is a high objective probability that a belief produced in accord with that design 
plan is true. Another feature is that the system in question must be functioning 
in a favorable environment, one that is decently well-suited for the successful 
operation of these faculties. 
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These features need to be supplemented in order to deal with variants of the 
Gettier problem that has plagued the theory of knowledge since Gettier’s original 
article in 1963.
12 Plantinga proposes to handle these problems by requiring that the 
minienvironment M with respect to the belief B and the exercise E of a cognitive 
faculty be favorable; for short, that MBE is favorable.    
Maxienvironments are what a design plan covers: whether the environment has light 
and air, whether it is full of radioactive waves or not, and the like. Any such maxienvi-
ronment covers a range of minienvironments: just add a further feature to a maxienvi-
ronment, one that the design plan does not address, and you get a minienvironment. 
A specific minienvironment includes all the features not specified in the maxienviron-
ment.
13 
As just noted, the crucial notion here is what it is for MBE to be favorable. 
Plantinga has tried several accounts of this notion, and, though it is a slight detour 
from the main thread of the argument here, it is instructive to note how his most 
recent account fails. His latest attempt, in Warranted Christian Belief, distin-
guishes those parts of the MBE that are detectable to S from those that are not. 
The conjunction of all the detectable parts he calls the DMBE. He then defines 
favorability of an MBE as follows: 
MBE is favorable just if there is no state of affairs S included in MBE but not in DMBE 
such that the objective probability of B with respect to the conjunction of DMBE and S 
falls below r,
 14 
where r is a reasonably high probability, at a minimum higher than .5. 
This account fails to explain a variant of one of the standard cases in the lit-
erature on the Gettier problem. That example is found in the literature on the 
defeasibility approach to knowledge which involves a purported pair of twins, 
Tom and Buck. As the case goes, you see Tom steal a book from the library, but 
Tom’s psychotic mother invents a story which she tells the police that it was 
really Tom’s twin brother Buck who stole the book, hoping thereby to save Tom 
from his predicament. You do not hear the story told to the police, and the po-
lice do not need to take the story seriously–they have a large file of such stories 
from Tom’s mother, aimed at protecting her son. They’ve even heard this very 
concoction before. 
In such a case, her story doesn’t undermine your knowledge that Tom stole 
the book. But one feature of the total situation is that Tom’s mother says that an 
identical twin stole the book and that Tom was out of the country. Given every-
thing that you can detect about your situation together with the state of affairs 
of Tom’s mother’s report gives a quite low probability to your belief. How low? 
That is hard to say, but if one were to add the information that Tom’s mother 
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said what she did, the reasonable thing to do would be to take back one’s claim 
that Tom stole the book, indicating that the probability need not be reasonably 
high, so we can add that in fact the probability is not reasonably high and still 
have a possible situation. 
The problem raised by the Tom/Buck case is just the problem of misleading 
defeaters, and it is easy to see how Plantinga’s latest account of favorable 
minienvironments succumbs to it. What makes a defeater misleading is the 
existence of further, veridical information that overrides the misleading informa-
tion in question, and Plantinga’s account above ignores the way in which further 
features can override in this way. His account, in short, fails to attend to the 
possibility of misleading pockets of information, insisting instead that all such 
information must be non-misleading. 
In any case, we can ignore this problem for present concerns. Our primary 
concern is with the package that identifies knowledge with true belief plus some 
factor that involves proper function by faculties aimed at truth a good at achiev-
ing it, in a cooperative environment where the relevant mini-environment re-
mains favorable. Yet, once we have seen in the last section the fundamental 
problems facing denials of the presupposition in Sellars’ problem, it is not hard 
to see how to transpose them into the present key, however. If we deny that 
there needs to be any relation of appropriateness between experience and belief, 
but only other relationships such as the ones just enumerated, then there are no 
barriers to counting as knowledge even the wildest and most implausible of 
such relationships. Plantinga, in criticizing coherentism, imagines a mountain 
climber having a coherent system of beliefs together with the experiences ap-
propriate to the mountain-climbing environment, who is struck by some malady 
that freezes the system of beliefs in question. Upon being taken down from the 
mountain and placed in an opera, the belief system doesn’t change, but the 
class of experiences clearly does. Plantinga takes this example as a clear refuta-
tion of coherentism. It is not, of course, since it is an attack directed only at one 
version of coherentism, the kind that denies the presupposition of Sellars’ prob-
lem. Once we see this point, however, it is easy to see that the objection is only 
as good an objection to coherentism as it is against Plantinga’s own proposal. 
For it is clearly possible that the connections between experience and belief that 
characterize the mountain climber are truth-conducive and in accord with the 
design plan of the cognitive system in question. Moreover, the other features of 
Plantinga’s account can be met as well, with the possible exception of the issue 
of the proper functioning of the defeater system. 
One might appeal to the defeater system to save the theory from this prob-
lem, but I think such an appeal only highlights the problem. Note first that a 
properly functioning defeater system will not ordinarily undermine truth-
conducive input/output relationships, so if the particular connection imagined in 
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occur, we need a special reason for thinking that the defeater system is properly 
functioning only if it undermines this connection. The only way I can see to get 
that result is to say that the defeater system functions so as to honor evidential 
connections; it kicks in whenever the input/output connections do not honor the 
evidential connections in question. That requires, however, that the defeater 
system kick in when no evidence is present as well as when the evidence con-
firms some contrary of the proposition in question. 
If the defeater system is characterized in a way that preserves this point and 
thereby allows the theory to survive such counterexamples, we have all the 
information in place to provide a complete theory of evidence. Once we have a 
complete theory of evidence, however, we have done everything necessary to 
sustain the presupposition of Sellars’ Problem, as I argued in the last section. 
The proper conclusion to draw is that nothing is gained by focusing on the the-
ory of knowledge itself rather than on the theory of justification, for the same 
issues reappear even if in a slightly different guise. To solve them, one will need 
a properly functioning defeater system, and to characterize such a system, one 
will need a complete theory of evidence, thereby providing the requisite materi-
als to sustain the presupposition of Sellars’ problem that had been hoped to be 
avoided. 
Conclusion 
Sellars’ problem is among the deepest and most interesting problems of 
epistemology, along with such perennial problems as the regress problem and 
the problem of the criterion. Plantinga’s theory of knowledge partakes of the 
approach to this problem by denying a presupposition of its formulation, a pre-
supposition to the effect that the relationship between experience and belief 
must fall within the general category of that which is intelligible to the intellect. 
Plantinga’s theory is also a version of doxasticism, and the connections between 
this approach and the denial of this presupposition are strong ones. In the end, 
however, such approaches are problematic, and give no satisfying account of 
knowledge, justification, warrant, or any other surrogate for such. The proper 
conclusion here is that Sellars’ Problem deserves a real solution, not some at-
tempted circumvention of it. 